Latent Belief Theory and Belief Dependencies: A Solution to the Recovery
  Problem in the Belief Set Theories by Arisaka, Ryuta
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
01
42
5v
4 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 27
 Ja
n 2
01
6
Latent Belief Theory and Belief Dependencies: A Solution to the Recovery
Problem in the Belief Set Theories
Ryuta Arisaka
ryutaarisaka@gmail.com
Abstract
The AGM recovery postulate says: assume a set of
propositionsX ; assume that it is consistent and that
it is closed under logical consequences; remove a
belief P from the set minimally, but make sure that
the resultant set is again some set of propositions
X ′ which is closed under the logical consequences;
now add P again and close the set under the logical
consequences; and we should get a set of proposi-
tions that contains all the propositions that were in
X . This postulate has since met objections; many
have observed that it could bear counter-intuitive
results. Nevertheless, the attempts that have been
made so far to amend it either recovered the postu-
late in full, had to relinquish the assumption of the
logical closure altogether, or else had to introduce
fresh controversies of their own. We provide a so-
lution to the recovery paradox in this work. Our
theoretical basis is the recently proposed belief the-
ory with latent beliefs (simply the latent belief the-
ory for short). Firstly, through an example, we will
illustrate that the vanilla latent belief theory can be
made more expressive. We will identify that a la-
tent belief, when it becomes visible, may remain
visible only while the beliefs that triggered it into
the agent’s consciousness are in the agent’s belief
set. In order that such situations can be also han-
dled, we will enrich the latent belief theory with be-
lief dependencies among attributive beliefs, record-
ing the information as to which belief is supported
of its existence by which beliefs. We will show
that the enriched latent belief theory does not pos-
sess the recovery property. The closure by logical
consequences is maintained in the theory, however.
Hence it serves as a solution to the open problem in
the belief set theories.
1 Introduction
The belief theory with latent beliefs, the latent belief theory
for short, was recently proposed [2]. In the framework, ev-
ery evidence {P}⋄ is a collection of propositions, consist-
ing of one primary proposition P and zero or more attribu-
tive propositions expressed in triples: P (P1, P2) for some P1
and P2. Each P (P1, P2) is basically P2 in any environment
that contains P1; otherwise, it is a latent belief not presently
visible, despite its existence, within the environment. What
we have called an environment is, in the particular setting of
the belief theory, a set of propositions and triples associated
to them. Since they characterise the beliefs held by a ratio-
nal agent, an environment is representative of the state of the
mind of a rational agent’s, which we may then just call a be-
lief set, as in the AGM belief theory [1]. A logical closure
property holds in the latent belief theory: if P1, . . . , Pn are
in a belief set, then any proposition that is a logical conse-
quence of any one or any ones in conjunction of them is also
in the belief set. But because the belief sets in the latent belief
theory could also contain those triples, they hold more infor-
mation in general than a belief set in a traditional belief set
theory does. To illustrate the point of the triples, suppose that
{P}⋄ consists of P, P (P1, P2) and P (P3, P4). Suppose that
an agent believes P1, i.e. his/her belief set contains P1. Then
P (P1, P2) is basically P2 to the agent; and P2 is in the belief
set. But suppose that it does not contain P3; then it is not
necessarily the case that P4 is in the set. Suppose that P4 is
not in the set, then {P, P2} will be the agent’s perception of
{P}⋄. Nonetheless, if P3 is added to the set, then the agent’s
perception of {P}⋄ will be {P, P2, P4}. As this example il-
lustrates, the latent belief theory captures the dynamic nature
of a belief/knowledge within the mind of a rational agent’s.
Some constituents of {P}⋄ are visible, some others may be
latent, depending on what beliefs are visible to his/her con-
scious mind.
Let us contemplate upon the triples. In [2], a latent belief,
once it becomes visible to an agent, will acquire the equal
significance in footing to any other visible beliefs that he/she
holds. In particular, if P (P1, P2) is latent to him/her, and if
P2 becomes visible, then contraction of his/her belief set by
P does not necessarily entail the loss of P2. There are many
scenarios that justify the particular behaviour. Consider the
following propositions.1
1. P1: The nerdy-looking
boy is Conan.
2. P2: There was a high
school kid, Shinichi
Kudo, who was a
renowned detective.
3. P3: Conan is Shinichi
Kudo.
1This example is sketched out of Detective Conan.
Suppose the following structure for {P1}⋄: {P1}⋄ =
({P1}, {P1(P2, P3)}), having the primary proposition P1 as
well as one attributive proposition P1(P2, P3). It is not the
case that P1 implies P2 or P3. Neither is it the case P2 or P3
P1. Now, suppose an agent who, among all the other propo-
sitions, believes P1, but does not believe either of P2 and P3.
That is, suppose that his/her perception of {P1}⋄ is {P1}.
When he/she learnsP2, then P3 is triggered into his/her mind.
His/her perception of {P1}⋄ is now {P1, P3}. Let us say that
his/her belief set is then contracted by P1. But there is no
reason that P3 must be also dropped off, even though it was
attributive to P1 when it was latent. He/she does not believe
{P1}⋄ any more; but he/she will still believe P3, (or {P3}⋄
which includes P3).
1.1 The need for tracking belief dependencies
among attributive beliefs
However, there are other cases where the dependency should
carry over. Consider the following proposition {P1}⋄: Belief
changes can be characterised in logic. Suppose the following
propositions.
1. P1: Belief changes can
be characterised in the
AGM belief theory.
2. P2: Minimal removal
of beliefs is not a ran-
dom operation.
3. P3: Other postulates to
the existing AGM pos-
tulates characterise be-
lief retention more re-
alistically.
Suppose that {P1}⋄ = ({P1}, {P1(P2, P3)}). Suppose
some rational agent who knows about the basic AGM postu-
lates but who does not know about the supplementary postu-
lates. Suppose that the agent perceives {P1} for {P1}⋄. From
some psychology magazine, he/she perceives {P2}⋄. Let us
say for simplicity that {P2}⋄ = ({P2}, ∅). Upon his/her ac-
cepting it, P3, a part of {P1}⋄ hitherto unknown to him/her,
comes into his/her consciousness. But in no time, some exter-
nal source convinces him/her that the decision on what beliefs
remain and what beliefs get removed after a minimal belief
contraction is as unpredictable as throwing a die. So he/she
drops P2. In no time, his/her apprehension grows, and he/she
becomes dismissive of logically representing belief changes.
The proposition P1 must go. But so must P3, since it has
existed on the presumption that it be possible to characterise
belief changes in logic, that is, in the AGM theory as he/she
perceives it.
1.2 Outlines; on the side theme concerning the
recovery property; and other remarks
To bring the extra expressiveness that differentiates the two
cases into the latent belief theory, in Section 2 we enrich the
theory by defining belief dependencies among attributive be-
liefs. The basic idea is to extend the definition of an attribu-
tive belief to include the fourth parameter: P (P1, P2, n) so
that n can determine what beliefs P2 will depend on once
it becomes visible. As P2 is made to exist by P and P1,
the number of the possibilities is four, and it suffices if n
ranges over {0, 1, 2, 3}. Now, once P2 becomes visible from
P (P1, P2, n), we can say that if n = 0, then P2 is an au-
tonomous belief, independent of P1 and of P2; if n = 1, then
it is a dependent belief, independent of P2 but dependent on
P1; if n = 2, then it is a dependent belief, independent of P1
but dependent on P2; and if n = 3, then it exists on the exis-
tences of both P1 and P2. We store the information of which
belief is dependent on what beliefs in a table comprising pairs
of a proposition P and a set of propositions Γ on which P is
dependent. For instance, it may contain (P, {P1}). Suppose
that a belief set contains P, P1 among all the other beliefs,
and that it has this table. Then, if the belief set is contracted
such that P1 no longer remains in the resulting belief set, then
it must also happen that the set do not contain P which - so
does the table say - cannot exist unless P1 is visible. When-
ever a set of new propositions are added to or removed from
a belief set, the change is reflected upon the table whose con-
tents are updated appropriately through a set of update postu-
lates.
In Section 3, we present all the belief change postulates, to
complete the development of the enriched latent belief theory.
We then show that there is no recovery property in our theory.
As a brief reminder, the (AGM) recovery postulate says: as-
sume a set of propositions X ; assume that it is consistent and
that it is closed under logical consequences; remove a belief
P from the set minimally, but make sure that the resultant set
is again some set of propositionsX ′ which is closed under the
logical consequences; now add P again and close the set un-
der the logical consequences; and we should get a logically
closed set of propositions that contains all the propositions
that were in X . This postulate has since met objections, many
researchers observing that it could bear counter-intuitive re-
sults. However, the attempts that have been made so far to
amend it either recovered the postulate in full, or else had to
introduce fresh controversies of their own [7]. Our theory of-
fers the sought-after solution to the recovery paradox. Section
4 concludes.
2 Formalisation of dependencies among
attributive beliefs and of belief sets
Readers may benefit from reading the first few sections of
[2]. Although this section is technically self-contained, a de-
tailed intuition is not given to each definition due to space
limitation, which is, however, found in the reference. For the
intuition of the key new notations as well as examples that
illustrate why they are introduced, readers may find it useful
to refer back to Section 1.
Let us assume a set of possibly uncountably many atomic
propositions. We denote the set by P , and refer to each ele-
ment by p with or without a subscript. More general propo-
sitions are constructed from P and the logical connectives of
propositional classical logic: {⊤0,⊥0,¬1,∧2,∨2}. The sub-
scripts denote the arity. Although the classical implication⊃2
is not used explicitly, it is derivable from ¬ and ∨ in the usual
manner: p1 ⊃ p2 ≡ ¬p1 ∨ p2. The set of literals, i.e. any p or
¬p for p ∈ P , is denoted by Lit. The set of all the propositions
is denoted by Props; and each element of Props is referred
to by P with or without a subscript. Let us assume that, given
any O ⊆ 2Props, L(O) is the set of all the propositions that
are the logical consequences of any (pairs of) elements in O.
A set of propositions U is said to be consistent iff for any
P ∈ Props, if P ∈ U , then ¬P 6∈ U ; and if ¬P ∈ U ,
then P 6∈ U . Let us assume that, for any tuples of some sets
(U1, . . . , Uk), we have pii((U1, . . . , Uk)) = Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤
k. Let us further assume that the union of two tuples of sets:
(U1, . . . , Uk) ∪ (U ′1, . . . , U
′
k) is (U1 ∪ U ′1, . . . , Uk ∪ U ′k).
Definition 1 (Associations and attributive beliefs[2]). An as-
sociation tuple is a tuple (I, X,Assoc). LetN be {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Then I is a mapping from Lit to 2Props×Props×N. X is an
element of 2Props. And Assoc is a mapping from Props to
2Props×Props×N. Let Exc be a mapping from Props to 2Props
such that Exc(P ) = L({P})∪{P1 ∈ Props | P ∈ L({P1})}.
Then I is defined to satisfy that, for any P ∈ Lit, if either
P1 ∈ Exc(P ) or P2 ∈ Exc(P ), then (P1, P2) 6∈ I(P ).
Assoc is defined to satisfy (1) that if P is a tautology, then
Assoc(P ) = (∅, ∅, 0); (2) that if ¬P is tautology, then
Assoc(P ) = (Props,Props, 0); and (3) that, if neither;
• Assoc(P ) = I if P ∈ Lit.
• Assoc(P1 ∧ P2) = (Assoc(P1) ∪ Assoc(P2)) ↓ Exc(P1 ∧
P2) where (U1, U2, n) ↓ U3 = (U ′1, U ′2, n) such that U ′1,2 =
U1,2\U3.
• Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) = Assoc(P1 ∧ P2) if P1, P2 ∈ X .
• Assoc(P1∨P2) = Assoc(Pi) if¬Pj ∈ X for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6=
j.
• Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) = Assoc(Pi) ↓ Exc(P1 ∧ P2) if Pi ∈ X and
Pj ,¬Pj 6∈ X for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
• Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) consists of all the pairs (Px, Py , n) satisfying
the following, otherwise: there exists (Pa, PA, n1) in Assoc(P1)
and there exists (Pb, PB , n2) in Assoc(P2) such that (1) Px =
Pa; (2) L(Pa) = L(Pb); (3) n1 = n2; (4) either PB ∈ L(PA)
or PA ∈ L(PB); (5) if PB ∈ L(PA), then Py = PB , else if
PA ∈ L(PB), then Py = PA; and (6) Px, Py 6∈ Exc(P1 ∧ P2).
• Assoc(¬(P1 ∧ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2).
• Assoc(¬(P1 ∨ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2).
We call each P (P1, P2, n) for some beliefs P, P1 and P2
and some n a belief quadruple, and denote the set of belief
quadruples by BQuad. We define the set {P (P1, P2, n) ∈
BQuad | [(P1, P2, n) ∈ Assoc(P )] ∧† [(P1, P2) 6=
(Props,Props)]}2 to be the set of beliefs attributive to P . We
denote the set by Cond(P ). We denote ⋃P∈Props′ Cond(P )
by Cond(Props′) where Props′ ⊆ Props. If Props′ =
Props, we denote it simply by Cond.
The third condition of the sixth item for disjunction, which
says that (Pa, PA, n1) in Assoc(P1) and (Pb, PB, n2) in
Assoc(P2) are not comparable unless both of the PA and PB
have the same attributive belief dependency (i.e. n1 = n2),
could be possibly relaxed to be less conservative. We will
leave the consideration to a future work.
2 In lengthy formal expressions, we use meta-connectives
∧†,∨†,→†,∀,∃ in place for conjunction, disjunction, material
implication, universal quantification and existential quantification,
each following the semantics in classical logic.
2.1 Belief sets and axioms, and update postulates
In our enriched latent belief theory, a belief base is de-
fined to contain a subset of Props and a set of quadruples:
Pa(Pb, Pc, n) where Pa, Pb, Pc ∈ Props and n ∈ N. Addi-
tionally, it is defined to contain a table consisting of pairs of
(P,Γ) ∈ Props × 2Props, which records which belief is de-
pendent on what beliefs. Let us denote a set of the pairs by Π
with or without a subscript. Let us call some tuple (Γ,∆,Π)
for some Γ ∈ 2Props\∅, some ∆ ∈ 2BQuad and some Π a be-
lief base. We denote the set of belief bases by BBase, and
refer to each element by B with or without a subscript. A
belief set is defined to be an element of BBase that satisfies
the following axioms.
1. L(pi1(B)) = pi1(B) (Logical closure).
2. If P ∈ pi1(B), then there is a finite subset X of pi1(B)
such that P ∈ L(X). (Compactness).
3. If P 6∈ pi1(B), then for any P1, P2 ∈ Props and any n ∈
N it holds that P (P1, P2, n) 6∈ pi2(B) (Attributive belief
adequacy).
4. If P ∈ pi1(B), then (P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B) for some Γ (Support
adequacy 1).
5. If P 6∈ pi1(B), then (P,Γ) 6∈ pi3(B) for any Γ (Support
adequacy 2).
6. If (P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B), then Γ 6= ∅ (Support sanity).
7. If (P1,Γ1), (P2,Γ2), (P1 ∨ P2,Γ) ∈ pi3(B), then L(Γ1) ∪
L(Γ2) = L(Γ) (Disjunctive support propagation).
8. If (P1,Γ1), (P2,Γ2), (P1 ∧ P2,Γ) ∈ pi3(B), then L(Γ1) ∩
L(Γ2) = L(Γ) (Conjunctive support propagation).
9. If (P1,Γ1), (P2,Γ2) ∈ pi3(B) such that L(P1) ⊆ L(P2),
then L(Γ2) ⊆ L(Γ1) (Support monotonicity).
10. If P is a tautology such that P ∈ pi1(B), then if (P,Γ) ∈
pi3(B), then ⊤ ∈ Γ (Tautological support).
Compared to the definition of a belief set as found in [2], this
definition does not conduct the fixpoint iterations. For the ax-
ioms around the third component of a belief base (the items
from 4 to 10), insertion of a couple of notes here may be use-
ful. The (Support adequacy 1), the (Support adequacy 2) and
the (Support sanity) ensure that if B is a belief set, then that
P is in pi1(B) means that (P,Γ) for a non-empty Γ ∈ 2Props
is in pi3(B), and vice versa. The (Disjunctive support prop-
agation) and the (Conjunctive support propagation) say how
supporting propositions are determined, deterministically up
to L, along the L ladders. The basic functionality of the (Sup-
port monotonicity) is to make L(Γ1) = L(Γ2) in case P1 and
P2 are indistinguishable in L. Finally the (Tautological sup-
port) effectively states that a tautological belief in a belief set
is independent of any non-tautological beliefs. We say that a
belief base B, a belief set in particular, is consistent iff pi1(B)
is consistent.
The following sets of postulates: one for when an item
is added to it, as characterised by the operator ◦B for B ∈
BBase which takes a belief base and a pair of a proposition
and a set of propositions to return a belief base; and one for
when an item is removed from it, as characterised by the op-
erator−B forB ∈ BBase which takes a belief base and a set
of propositions to return a belief base, define rules for updat-
ing the support table (which is the third component of a belief
base).
Support table augmentation operator ◦ satisfies the follow-
ing.
1. For each (P,Γ) ∈ Π1, if (P,Γx) ∈ pi3(B), then (P,Γx ∪
Γ ∪
⋃
{(P1,Γ1)∈Π1 | L(P )⊆L(P1)} Γ1) ∈ pi3(B ◦B Π1).
2. For each (P,Γ) ∈ Π1, if (P,Γx) 6∈ pi3(B) for no Γx, then
(P,Γ ∪
⋃
{(P1,Γ1)∈Π1 | L(P )⊆L(P1)} Γ1) ∈ pi3(B ◦B Π1).
3. If (Px,Γx) ∈ pi3(B) and if, for all (P,Γ) ∈ Π1, it holds
that Px 6∈ Exc(P ), then (Px,Γx) ∈ pi3(B ◦B Π1).
4. If (P,Γ) 6∈ pi3(B), and if (P1,Γ1) 6∈ Π1 for any Γ1 and
for any P1 such that L({P1}) = L({P}) 6= L({⊤}), then
(P2,Γ2) 6∈ pi3(B ◦B Π1) for any Γ2 and any P2 such that
L(P2) = L(P ).
5. pii(B) = pii(B ◦B Π1)) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
6. B ◦B (P,Γ) satisfies the earlier axioms.
To explain these a little, the fifth postulate ensures that the
operation ◦B acts, if any, only upon pi3(B), leaving pi1,2(B)
intact. Because of this, whatever changes that ◦B operation
would make to pi3(B), the sixth postulate guarantees, through
the (Support adequacy 1) and the (Support adequacy 2), that
any (P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B ◦B Π1) is linked to P ∈ pi1(B ◦B Π1):
it is in pi3(B ◦B Π1) only if P ∈ pi1(B ◦B Π1). Now, as
to what those supporting sets of beliefs are for each belief, if
B satisfies the axioms 7 - 10, then determining the support-
ing set of beliefs for each of key beliefs suffices to determine
all the other supporting sets for each belief, due again to the
sixth postulate which includes (Disjunctive support propaga-
tion) and (Conjunctive support propagation). As for what the
key beliefs are, there are those beliefs in B that are unrelated
to the elements of Π1 by L. Their supporting set of beliefs
should not change, which is ensured in the third postulate.
Apart from those beliefs, it suffices to ensure the first two
postulates to determine all the other supporting sets. Finally,
the fourth postulate ensures that the change to B should be
minimal by the ◦B operation.
Support table reduction operator− satisfies the following.
Here X\\Y denotes {P ∈ X | [L({P}) = L({⊤})]∨† [¬†∃P1 ∈
Y.L({P1}) = L({P})]}.
1. [(P1,Γ1\\Γ) ∈ pi3(B −B Γ)] if [(P1,Γ1) ∈ pi3(B)].
2. If (P1,Γ1) ∈ pi3(B −B Γ), then (P1,Γx) ∈ pi3(B) for
Γx = Γ1 ∪ Γ or else Γx = Γ1.
3. pii(B) = pii(B −B Γ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
4. B −B Γ satisfies the earlier axioms except for (Support
sanity).
The reduction operation is simpler, trying to remove match-
ing elements off each (P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B). Then the earlier ax-
ioms, in particular the (Support adequacy 1) and the (Support
adequacy 2) link the elements to the first component of B.
The reason that we do not include the (Support sanity) in the
fourth postulate is just so that we can get the belief contrac-
tion operation right in the next section.
3 Belief change postulates
Let us define thatz is the belief expansion operator in our be-
lief theory,; the belief contraction operator, and⋆ the belief
revision operator. We require each one of them to be a fix-
point iterating process. Since the belief revision operation has
been always a derivable operation in the AGM tradition, we
only definez and;; and, later on, will show how the two op-
erations are combined into⋆. The graphical representations
of Binitz{P}⋄ and Binit ; {P}⋄, assuming that Binit is a be-
lief set, are found in Figure 1.3 The VisibleB({P}⋄) comes
from [2]. It is P ∪ {P2 | [P (P1, P2, n) ∈ pi2({P}⋄)] ∧† [P1 ∈
pi1(B)]}. In both of the diagrams, X := Y denotes the as-
signment of Y to X . Γ := X ;B0 := Y means that the
assignment operations are taken in sequence: the assignment
to Γ, followed by that to B0. Both of the processes continue
until the fixpoint is reached.
We now define all the participants in the two representa-
tions. Before moving further, we recall ([2]) the postulate for
the association tuple.
Association tuple has one postulate:
1. Each B has an association tuple (I, pi1(B),Assoc) for
some I and some Assoc.
Internal expansion operator + has two postulates:
1. B + Γ = (L(pi1(B) ∪ Γ),Cond(pi1(B + Γ)), pi3(B)).
2. If the association tuple for B is (I, pi1(B),Assoc), then
that for B + Γ is (I, pi1(B + Γ),Assoc).
Internal contraction operator ÷ has the following postu-
lates:
1. B ÷ Γ = (L(B ÷ Γ),Cond(pi1(B ÷ Γ)), pi3(B)).
2. ∀P1 ∈ Γ.P1 6∈ L(⊤)→† pi1(B ÷ Γ).
3. pi1(B ÷ Γ) ⊆ pi1(B).
4. (∀P1 ∈ Γ.P1 6∈ pi1(B) ∨† P1 ∈ L(⊤))→† B ÷ Γ = B.
5. [L(Γ1) = L(Γ2)]→† [B ÷ Γ1 = B ÷ Γ2].
6. B ⊆ (B ÷ Γ) + Γ.
7. If the association tuple for B is (I, pi1(B),Assoc), then
that for B ÷ Γ is (I, pi1(B ÷ Γ),Assoc) (Association up-
date).
These postulates closely coincide with the AGM postulates
[1]. In passing, two more postulates may be added to the list
above: ∀P1 ∧ P2 ∈ Γ.[P1 6∈ Cn(B) ÷ Γ] →† [Cn(B) ÷ Γ ⊆
Cn(B)÷Γ(P1∧P2 7→ P1)]; and ∀P1∧P2 ∈ Γ.(Cn(B)÷Γ(P1∧
P2 7→ P1)) ∩ (Cn(B) ÷ Γ(P1 ∧ P2 7→ P2)) ⊆ Cn(B) ÷ Γ.
Γ(P1 ∧ P2 7→ Px) means to replace all the occurrences of
P1 ∧P2 ∈ Γ with Px. The two postulates are intended to reg-
ulate belief retention [1]. We are hardly concerned with these
supplementary postulates in this particular work, but a men-
tioning of them may be useful to a reader who is interested in
retention of the beliefs based on the concept of the epistemic
entrenchment. Somehow related to it, recall ([1]) that, gen-
erally speaking neither B ÷ Γ nor B + Γ is a deterministic
3 Although the inner components have not yet been formally de-
fined, we believe that the display of the visual representations, and
then detailing the concepts used there finely will better explain these
operations.
B0Binit B1
B1 := B0 ÷ Γ
Γ := Gen(B1,÷);B0 := Update(B1,÷)
Binit ; {P}⋄ (Belief contraction)
Γ := VisibleBinit({P}⋄);
B0 := Binit
B0Binit B1
B1 := B0 + Γ
Γ := Gen(B1,+);B0 := Update(B1,+);
Binitz{P}⋄ (Belief expansion)
Γ := VisibleBinit({P}⋄);
B0 := Binit
Figure 1: Graphical representations of the belief expansion Binitz{P}⋄ and the belief contraction Binit ; {P}⋄ in our latent
belief theory. Binit is assumed to be a consistent belief set, although the restriction is more a pragmatic than a technical one.
operation.
Gen and Update are defined as follows.
Gen(B,÷) := {P | [(P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B)] ∧† ([∀P1 ∈ Γ.P1 6∈
pi1(B)] ∨
† [Γ = ∅])}. Explanation: ÷ may remove beliefs off
the first component of a belief base. Suppose some beliefs
are indeed dropped off, and that we have B1 ⊂ B0 (see the
graphical representation). Now, it could be that some propo-
sition Px ∈ B1 may have lost all the propositions for support-
ing its existence. Then Px can no longer subsist in B1, which
will be further contracted by all such Px in the next round of
the fixpoint iteration.
Gen(B,+) := {P2 | [P (P1, P2, n) ∈ pi2(B)] ∧† [P, P1 ∈
pi1(B)]}. Explanation: When a belief base is augmented with
a new set of beliefs, it could happen that latent beliefs become
visible, which is a subset of all the propositions generated by
this set construction.
Update(B,÷) := B −B {P | [(P,Γ) ∈ pi3(B)] ∧† [P 6∈
pi1(B)]}. Explanation: The support table is updated to re-
flect the loss of beliefs by ÷. Specifically, any element in
pi3(B) is removed if the first component of the element is no
longer in pi1(B). However, recall that the − operation does
not satisfy the (Support sanity) axiom. Hence even if the op-
eration should generate some (P,Γ) such that Γ = ∅, it is not
removed from the third component.
Update(B,+) := B ◦B {(P2,Γ) | [P (P1, P2, n) ∈ pi2(B)] ∧†
[Γ = ρ(P (P1, P2, n)]} where ρ(P (P1, P2, n)) is {⊤} if n = 0;
is {P} if n = 1; is {P1} if n = 2; and is {P, P1} if n = 3.
There is certain difficulty in having an intuitively appealing
representation theorem of ; non-iteratively. In the AGM be-
lief contraction operation, the belief set as a set of proposi-
tions, say X , is contracted by some proposition P . No matter
how many candidates are for the result of the contraction op-
eration, the candidates are determined byX and P alone with
no other non-deterministic factors. However, in our char-
acterisation, the (k + 1)-th fixpoint iteration depends upon
the result of the k-th internal contraction by ÷, which can
be known only non-deterministically. This makes it hard to
generate a set-based representation of the contraction opera-
tion such that it retain the same intuitive appeal as the AGM
representation theorem does. For this reason, we regard the
transition systems shown earlier as the representation theo-
rem equivalents for; andz. By contrast, the internal opera-
tions by + and÷ almost exactly emulate the AGM expansion
and contraction operators (Cf. [1]), and the set-based repre-
sentation is feasible for each of them without costing intuitive
appeal. Particularly for÷, it goes as follows [1]. Suppose that
B is a belief set. Then, pi1(B) ÷ Γ =
⋂
(γ(Ξ(pi1(B),Γ))).
Ξ is a mapping from belief sets and propositions into belief
sets. For any belief set B and any Γ, we say that a belief set
B1 satisfying pi1(B1) ⊆ pi1(B) is a maximal subset of pi1(B)
for Γ iff
1. For any P1 ∈ Γ, P1 6∈ pi1(B1) if P1 is not a tautology.
2. For any belief set B2, if pi1(B1) ⊂ pi1(B2) ⊆ pi1(B), then
there exists some Pa ∈ Γ such that Pa ∈ pi1(B2).
We define Ξ(pi1(B),Γ) to be the set of all the subsets of
pi1(B) maximal for Γ. We further define a function γ, so
that, if Ξ(pi1(B),Γ) is not empty, then γ(Ξ(pi1(B),Γ)) is a
subset of Ξ(pi1(B),Γ); or if it is empty, it is simply pi1(B).
Binit B0 B1
B2 B3
B0 := Binit;
Γ := Visible−Binit({P}
⋄)
B1 := B0 ÷ Γ
Γ := Gen(B1,÷);B0 := Update(B1,÷)
If Γ = ∅, then B2 := B1; Γ := VisibleBinit({P}⋄)
B3 := B2 + Γ
Γ := Gen(B3,+);B2 := Update(B3,+)
;
z
Binit⋆{P}⋄ (Belief revision)
Figure 2: The belief revision operation Binit ⋆ {P}⋄ as a composition of the belief contraction and expansion.
Then we have that pi1(B) ÷ Γ =
⋂
(γ(Ξ(pi1(B),Γ))).
Fromz and ;, we define the belief revision operator:
B ⋆ {P}⋄ = (B ; (Visible−B({P}⋄)), ∅) z
(VisibleB({P}⋄),Cond(VisibleB({P}⋄)).
And we have the representation in the transition system, as
shown in Figure 2. For the same reason that has hindered us
from having a set-based representation of;without losing an
appeal to intuition, it is difficult to come up with non-iterative
postulates for ⋆. This is not the sign that our theory is not
robust. It just confirms the point that every belief change op-
eration is an iterative process in our theory.
Theorem 1 (Preservation). Let B be a consistent belief set.
Then B z {P}⋄, B ; {P}⋄ and B ⋆ {P}⋄ are again a
belief set.
Let us also note the following important result.
Theorem 2 (No recovery). Let B be some belief set,
and let {P}⋄ be some external information. Then we
can find a pair of B, {P}⋄ such that both of the fol-
lowing fail to hold. pi1(B) ⊆ pi1((B ; {P}⋄)z{P}⋄).
pi1(B) ⊆ pi1((B ; {P}⋄)z(VisibleB({P}⋄), ∅)).
Proof. The first weaker result holds already in the vanilla
latent belief theory; Cf. [2]. To give the evidence that
pi1(B) 6⊆ pi1((B ; {P}⋄)z(VisibleB({P}⋄, ∅))), sup-
pose that our language is constructed from p1, p2, p3 and the
logical connectives {⊤,⊥,∧,∨}. Suppose that no pairs of
the three propositions are associated by the logical conse-
quences. Now, suppose that B is a belief set; pi1(B) =
L({p1, p3}); pi2(B) contains p1(p2, p3, 1) but does not con-
tain any Px(Py , Pz, n) such that L(Pz) ⊆ L(p3) or that
L(p3) ⊆ L(Pz); and that pi3(B) contains (p3, {p1}), among
others. Then p3 6∈ (B ; {p1}⋄). Suppose that B ; {p1}⋄
does not retain any logical consequence of p3 apart from tau-
tological propositions. Then the belief set contains no propo-
sitions Pα such that L(Pα) = L(Pz ⊃ p3) 6= L(⊤). Then
p3 6∈ (B ; {p1}
⋄)z({p1}, ∅), as required.
This result can be also adapted to the AGM belief theory, even
though there are no quadruples in the AGM setting, so long
as the same dependencies among propositions are facilitated
in the AGM operations of belief expansion and contraction.
With this remark, we are positive that this work has truly of-
fered a satisfactory solution to the recovery paradox as far as
the cases similar to the scenarios in the opening examples are
concerned.
4 Conclusion
We have presented an enriched latent belief theory, in which
belief dependencies based on how a latent belief has become
visible to agents’ belief sets can be expressed. We have shown
that there is no recovery postulate in our belief theory, thus
giving a solution to the recovery paradox that has been in the
belief set theories. Our theory indicates that the time may
have come to study beyond the Ga¨rdenfors’ principle [3]: “If
a belief state is revised by a sentence A, then all sentences
in K that are independent of the validity of A should be re-
tained in the revised state of belief”, upon which many current
works on dependencies, such as [6] for a recent one, appear to
be based. The examples in Section 1 in any case indicate that
beliefs, even though not connected by logical consequences,
can still be related by their contents, which is the standpoint
that has been already taken in [2]. Although we had to present
just the result, there appears to be some observation that has
not been detailed in the literature around the recovery para-
dox. In another work of ours, which is going to be much
less technical, we will have an overview of the paradox: what
it was, and how it was naturally resolved. One future work
will focus on applications of this enriched latent belief the-
ory. Connection to theories of concurrency in computer sci-
ence will be sought after.
Related works
Several works questioned the AGM recovery postulate [4; 5;
7]. The attempt to amend it has not been successful within
the belief set setting, however. There are works on belief re-
vision with non-classical logics that do not have the classical
logical consequence relations. Not surprisingly, the recovery
property does not necessarily hold in the setting, as evidenced
also in the belief base theory, which was cultivated notably by
Hansson and others.
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